Thursday, December 27, 2018

WHAT CAN FOLLOW AMERICA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA. By Ghassan Kadi 20 December 2018


Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria creates a new fork in the road which can take Syria in several directions. Much has been said about this subject in the last two days, but Ghassan Kadi presents his thoughts from a more expansive and comprehensive perspective.

What Can Follow America’s Withdrawal From Syria

by Ghassan Kadi for The Saker Blog

Just before Trump announced that American troops are to leave Syria “immediately”, many compatriots, friends and analysts were wondering what could be the next event that might change the course of future events in northern and eastern Syria. The first reaction to the news of Trump ordering his troops to leave Syria took many by surprise. That said, we have to wait and see if Trump does not wake up tomorrow changing his mind. The reason behind Trump’s decision to withdraw is not very important and as far as this article is concerned, it is irrelevant. If he wants to believe that he is leaving victoriously, that’s fine, for as long as he does leave. That said, the sudden resignation of Mattis clearly indicates that the former top gun does not see it with the same spectacles. Either way, the withdrawal, if it happens, may end up to be a long and protracted process that could take weeks, months and perhaps years, and the manner in which it happens opens the doors for many possibilities and contingencies.

Before Trump’s decision, there were two serious nagging and unresolved problems in Syria standing in the way of ending the war and the commencement of rebuilding the war-ravaged nation; and they were the ongoing presence of the terrorists in Idlib and the presence of American troops in the North East.

Idlib has been the sink hole of Syria, a place where all terrorists ended up. In any major battles, all the way from the battle of Al-Qusayr in 2013 to the most recent battle of Daraa in 2018, all of which ended up with terrorists defeat, negotiations ended up with militants leaving the areas in secure buses and settling in Idlib. No one really knows how many of them are there at the present moment because the overall figure includes those who were bunkered there from the beginning. The estimates run from as low as 10,000 to a high 100,000. The truth is that we don’t know. The figure could well be outside those estimates; but they have to be huge nonetheless.

Regardless of the number, they are the only terrorists left who answer to Erdogan and/or who can be manipulated by him. If they don’t, they either have to fight to death or leave. But given that all of their supply lines come from Turkey, they don’t have much of a choice but to kowtow to the Sultan. The Sultan is using his loyal “troops” as a trump card for two reasons; first of all to continue to have a de-facto military presence in government-controlled areas in Syria, and secondly and most importantly perhaps, is because he regards the terrorists as his Muslim brothers, and it is his “duty” to protect them.

This was why when Russia and Syria were making preparations to go inside Idlib and clean it up, he told them that he could achieve the same objective with negotiations and that they can leave Idlib for him to deal with. A few months later, Russia and Syria are still waiting for him to come true to his word.

So what is Erdogan exactly trying to do in northern Syria and why are Putin and Assad putting up with him?

Before Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria, it was clear that Putin understands Erdogan too well. He knows that Erdogan has an Achilles Heel, two of them in fact; one in each foot. In many previous articles, I have reiterated that Erdogan is incurably both an Islamist and a Turkish nationalist; even though the ideologies are in total contradiction with each other. And even though he is cunning, calculating and prepared to wait for the right moment to act, when it comes to either nationalism or religion, he regresses into a programmed robot that is simply unable to think and act rationally; and Putin has been trying to use this weakness of Erdogan to serve his own objectives.

Erdogan wants to protect Al-Nusra in Idlib, and this is why Putin convinced Assad to leave the Idlib carrot in the hands of Erdogan, not necessarily because he believes that Erdogan will indeed deal with it in the manner that he should, but simply to present to him that Russia regards him like a credible partner.

On the other hand, the simmering tension between Ankara and Washington over the Kurdish issue has been coming to a head for a long time. Ever since America pledged support to Syrian Kurds, Erdogan, in blunt terms, has been clearly saying to his American “allies” that they must choose between Turkey and the Kurds. He has been making serious threats that he will attack Manbij and clean it up from Kurdish militants even if American troops do not leave.

Erdogan’s nationalist Achilles heel has left him in serious discord with his biggest NATO ally.

Given that the nationalist aspect of Erdogan is prepared to risk falling out with NATO and even fighting American troops in Syria just to prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish state south of his border, he was putting himself in the position of the former Afghani Mujahideen who were fighting their own war, and at the same time, serving another purpose for another group. With this stance, Erdogan presented that he was prepared to fight with America at any level, even militarily; because to him, the Kurdish issue was a redline that he was not prepared to see crossed.

For a while, a fair while in fact, Russia and Syria stood back and watched how the American-Turkish impasse morphed. It seemed that any potential fight would not only serve to prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish state, but would also end up with American withdrawal from Syria, and thus serving the objectives of both Syria and Russia.

And even though in theory it is the role and duty of Syria and her army to liberate the North-East from American presence, this course of action did not only risk a major confrontation with NATO and possible widespread bombing all over the country, but this option will also risk a direct confrontation between America and Russia on Syrian soil.

This was the only reason why Russia and Syria seemed prepared to put the resolution of the Idlib dilemma on hold. This is the only rational reason as to why they did not coerce Erdogan to rush into any quick action there before the problem of American presence has been resolved.

Knowingly or inadvertently, the American withdrawal from Syria, if it happens, will take a huge bargaining chip away from the hand of Erdogan in as far as his relationship with Russia is concerned. Erdogan will no longer be able to say to Russia that if Russia wants him to deal with America’s presence, then Russia must accept the deal with Idlib too.

In short and simple terms, the American withdrawal, if it happens, will take the decision of what happens in Idlib out of Erdogan’s hands.

The above sounds good, good for Syria, but the final outcome of this will depend on a number of factors, the most important of which is who is going to replace the American troops and how soon.

If America leaves behind a mercenary army as some speculate, fighting it will be logistically easier in the sense that it will not open the door for direct confrontation with United States army.

Depending on the pattern of withdrawal, the void generated by the retreating American troops can either be filled by the legal national Syrian Arab Army or by an invading Turkish army. But this depends on the location as well as the time table of withdrawal. If America for example leaves Deir Ezzor now, which is in the east and a couple of hundred kilometers south of Turkey’s border, the void will automatically be filled by the Syrian Army. However, if America leaves a northerly position such as Manbij, Turkey will move in before the Syrian Army will have a chance to do so. And such a scenario can spell more problems for Syria.

The problem here is more of a humanitarian nature than territorial, because sooner or later, Turkey will have to leave Syria. That said, if Turkish troops control any Syrian land, even for a short time, they will most likely declare open season on Syrian Kurds, and given Turkish history in dealing with such situations, this can be brutal.

On the other hand, if Erdogan tries to inflict a Kurdish massacre, then his Idlib carrot will turn into a stick lashing his own hide. For years, he had managed to juggle his contradictions of being a nationalist and an Islamist, but he will finally have to choose between his two alter egos. His nationalist ambition of annihilating Kurdish resistance in Syria can endanger his Muslim brothers in Idlib. His split-personality dilemma is finally coming to a head.

Would the man who was prepared to fight America if America supported a Kurdish state be also prepared to fight Russia if Russia attacked his Islamist brothers in Idlib?

Ideally, the best scenario possible for Syria and Russia, a resolution that will uphold Syria’s sovereignty and integrity all the while avert any Kurdish bloodshed, is for Syria and Russia to immediately fill in any gap created by retreating American forces. Erdogan must be kept out of Syria, and once his hands cannot reach Syrian Kurds any longer, he will no longer be able to have any say in Idlib.

Analysts Explain How Trump's Pull-Out From Syria Affects Turkey, Israel & Russia. Sputnik Interview Ghassan Kadi 25 Dec 2018

Ghassan Kadi’s thoughts on the stated US pullout from Syria

Analysts Explain How Trump's Pull-Out From Syria Affects Turkey, Israel & Russia

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The US' exit from Syria might have been prompted by purely financial factors, Syrian analysts told Sputnik, explaining how the withdrawal will affect Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Washington's European allies who continue to maintain a limited military presence on the ground in the Arab Republic.

Donald Trump's announced pull-out of American troops from Syria caught many by surprise, although the US president repeatedly vowed to withdraw military forces at some point. 

However, in early September, US Special Representative to Syria James Jeffrey made it clear that US military forces were "no longer pulling out by the end of the year". For its part, The Washington Post signalled that the Trump administration had set new goals for its military contingent in the region and would keep the 2,200 US troops there "indefinitely".

​The question then arises whether Trump has just delivered on his promise to pull out once Daesh* is defeated or whether there were specific conditions on the ground that prompted the sooner-than-expected withdrawal.

"We can speculate and come up with many reasons; the most important of which for a fiscal pragmatist like Trump is perhaps the actual financial cost factor," Ghassan Kadi, a political analyst of Syrian origin, told Sputnik. "Trump does not seem prepared to engage in military action unless someone else is paying for it, and this is not the case in Syria. The guy is a businessman and runs the US like a corporation with a profit and loss statement and investors to please".

According to Kadi, this approach "is not necessarily a bad thing for the world because previous administrations have squandered trillions of American tax payer money on destroying the world and achieving little else".

He noted that nothing had really happened on the ground recently to instigate such a move "unless Trump and Erdogan struck an under-the-table deal".

American soldier standing on an armored vehicle - Sputnik International
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Ex-NATO Commander Questions Trump Rationale to Withdraw US Troops From Syria
However, according to Kadi, "unless Trump promised to surrender his positions to Turkish troops, his withdrawal from Syria will leave Turkey in a position of disadvantage in Idlib".

For his part, Christopher Assad, a Canada-based political analyst of Syrian origin, presumed that Trump was obviously disenchanted by the fact that US overseas operations in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan failed to benefit the US in any capacity.

"The fact of the matter is that he discovered, almost two years into his presidency that his generals were full of hot air", Assad said. "His clues were clearly visible in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US forces have not made any progress in 'neutralising' these countries and have not brought them any closer to agreement with US policy in the region."

On the contrary, the analyst highlighted "the military's decision to arm and support the Kurdish secessionists in northern Syria actually threatened in making another US enemy in the region out of Islamic Turkey, as if that was possible".

US May Leave Syria, But It Won't Pull Out of Qatar, Persian Gulf

Commenting on Trump's decision to withdraw from Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed scepticism over the pull-out plan, referring to Washington's repeated vows to leave Afghanistan.

Both analysts called attention to the fact that even if the US entirely exits Syria it will continue to maintain a military presence in Qatar and the Persian Gulf.

"After all, America is in a state of attrition, and I don't believe that it will have the financial means to upkeep the same level of military presence it has abroad for much longer. That said, don't believe that the US will be leaving its Qatar base and naval positions in the Gulf any time soon," Kadi said.

According to Assad, "it also goes without saying that Trump's role as president is to keep his Empire's economy above water".

"Therefore, although he may remove troops out of Afghanistan, specially that Pakistan had recently cooled off her military and intelligence cooperation, he will not under any circumstance withdraw completely form the Arab Middle East because Iran is so squarely in the US military sites and remains the most coveted target of Empire".

Members of 5th Special Forces Group (A) conducting 50. Cal Weapons training during counter ISIS operations at Al Tanf Garrison in southern Syria.  - Sputnik International
Members of 5th Special Forces Group (A) conducting 50. Cal Weapons training during counter ISIS operations at Al Tanf Garrison in southern Syria.

Macron Can Better Use His Troops in the Avenue des Champs-Élysées

While the US military contingent is leaving the Syrian Arab Republic within the next 100 days, French President Emmanuel Macron has promised that "France will remain engaged in the Levant region".

US soldiers stand near military vehicles, north of Raqqa city, Syria. File photo - Sputnik International
US Pulling Troops Out of Syria Due to Failed MidEast Policy - Syrian Ambassador
Reportedly, Paris has also pledged to support Kurdish militia in northern Syria amid the American withdrawal.

"As for France, I could sarcastically say that Macron can better use his troops in the Avenue des Champs-Élysées", Kadi said, commenting on the issue.

"France is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UNSC, but it does not any longer have the geopolitical and military clout it thinks it has. If France decides to replace America in Syria, how would it imagine that it can be capable of success where America failed?" he asked rhetorically.

According to the political analyst, "Russia is the only power that has the respect and trust of all relevant parties" to "sponsor fair and proper mediations".

How the US Withdrawal From Syria May Affect Regional Players

So, how might the US pull-out affect America's regional allies — Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey?

"I cannot see how the pull-out can affect Saudi Arabia as such," Kadi said, adding that Riyadh is currently preoccupied with its domestic affairs and the media fuss over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

As for Israel, the analyst elaborated that "prior to Trump's decision to pull out of Syria, [his] guess was that America was going to use its presence on Syrian soil as a bargaining chip to guarantee Israel a trade-off that eventually guarantees a mutual and synchronised American/Iranian withdrawal".

"If Trump is true to his word, this is now an unlikely scenario," Kadi suggested. "A unilateral American pull-out can weaken Israel's position and leverage in negotiating an Iranian withdrawal. However, this will further bolster Russia's position as the only power that can broker future peace talks."

Assad holds a different stance. According to him, "the Israelis are in a win-win situation because they can continue to sow instability and instigate violence both in Iran and in Syria".

"Trumps' move, although may be good for the Syrians, will definitely embolden both Israel and Turkey, each for opposing reasons," he suggested. "It will free Turkey's hands to deal with the Kurdish problem, and will give the Israelis, British and the French the justification to continue the pursuit of a belligerent policy toward Syria using the Syrian Kurds as a ruse".

*Daesh (also known as ISIS/ISIL/IS) is a terrorist group banned in Russia

The views and opinions expressed by the contributor and the speakers do not necessarily reflect those of Sputnik.

Wednesday, December 19, 2018

The Elusive Middle East Peace. By Ghassan Kadi 18 December 2018

Ghassan Kadi’s thoughts on what looks like possible “peace talks” coming up in the region.

The Elusive Middle East Peace

by Ghassan Kadi for The Saker Blog

Subtle news sources coming on the grapevine allude to impending Middle East fresh peace talks. The end of the “War on Syria” will bring serious and realistic opportunities for Russian-sponsored peace talks, and there are direct and indirect hints and leaks made by certain officials here and there, hints and leaks which will become overt and obvious in the near future, culminating into news to the effect that new peace talks will resume.

The Arab/Israeli conflict seems intractable, and every time peace talks loom, we need to remember to examine the root of the problem and consider ways in which the deadlock can be surmounted.

Four decades after Kissinger pushed the USSR out of its position in the Arab/Israeli negotiation talks and made it law for America to defend Israel, the one-sided unparalleled superiority that America provided Israel with was not “good enough” to give Israel the “safe haven” that Zionism promised Jewish migrants with after the horrors of the Holocaust. If anything, the more aggression the state of Israel displayed and the more audacious America was in providing it with impunity, the more determined Palestinians became; and Hamas was the direct outcome of the joint Israeli/American bullying and the Palestinian despair that followed the supposed peace talks of the Oslo Agreement.

In retrospect, Kissinger, the man who gave “shuttle diplomacy” its name, has inadvertently created a deadlocked situation, and in doing so, America has done itself a huge disfavour in the unconditional support it provided Israel with over all those years and has turned itself into a de-facto pariah arbitrator; a mediator that axis-of-resistance Arabs, and all Palestinians in particular, do not trust. In doing so, it kicked itself out of the scene, paving the way for Russia to fill the void it left behind.

On the other hand, Russia is on talking terms with all parties in the Middle East and President Putin personally has good and strong relationships with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and of course Syria. Furthermore, Putin had all the reasons to sever ties with Erdogan, however the master of pragmatism managed to find a way to mend the rift without losing face, and even though Erdogan has not yet shown any credibility, Putin sees Turkey as a potential key player in the peace process in Syria.

Notwithstanding all of the above, all the American Russophobic rhetoric amounts to nothing, because America and Russia will always be on talking terms.

Briefly put, no entity other than Russia is potentially able to bring all Middle Eastern parties to the negotiation table, and the “hints” speak of such eventuality, come the end of the War on Syria; and this is what Putin wants.

In the meantime, relevant parties will have to accept to come to the negotiation table, and be prepared to negotiate.

It was easy back in 1948 for the Arabs to carry the “push them back” slogan; referring to sending Jewish migrants back to where they came from. More than seven decades after the establishment of Israel, if the Palestinian cause were to maintain the moral upper ground, this “ambition” can no longer apply to second and third generation Jews who were born in the land their forefathers migrated to; albeit those forefathers migrated and settled illegally. By the same token, and most importantly, Palestinians cannot be expected to take the moral upper ground alone without a reciprocal agreement that grants them the long-awaited justice; including the right of return.

And as negotiations mean to give and take, it is interesting to note that the English term is said in this sequence; give and take, rather than take and give, because if a negotiator does not begin with giving, he will not be able to take.

This will be the sticking point because religious hardliners on both Arab and Israeli sides have perfected the art of each claiming to be the rightful and exclusive owner of the Holy Land. As a matter of fact, it was only when the religious spin replaced the national argument of the Arab struggle that a secular fight was taken to theocratic camp and Zionism was, to some degree, able to use history to support its argument. That said, even though Jewish presence in Palestine indeed predates Islam, this does not justify the displacement of Palestinian Arabs, both Muslims and Christians. For Palestinians therefore to win both the humane and religious arguments, the endorsement of an Arab-Palestinian-Levantine identity and carrying its banner is one that cannot be refuted; because it is an all-inclusive definition; including Jews, and one that is moral and timeless.

But let us briefly examine the fundamentalist counter Muslim claim of the ownership of Palestine from a realistic vantage point. Are Muslims the rightful and exclusive owners of Palestine?

Back in 2011, I wrote an article titled “Palestine is not for Muslims”. I had it edited when the UN was voting for a Palestinian state, and now it is time to revise it.

The Quran is a Holy Book and not a real estate title deed. There is no mention of any land rights in the Quran. The city of Jerusalem (Al-Quds in Arabic) is not even mentioned in the Quran. There is however a mention of “Al-Masjed Al-Aksa” which Muslims believe to be in Jerusalem/Al-Quds. This does not make Al-Quds inherently a Muslim city, and even if it did, there is absolutely no reference in the Quran to any Muslim exclusivity.

Speaking of claims of exclusive ownership of Jerusalem, we cannot and should not ignore a time in history during which the Catholic Church was so desirous to take the city from the “infidels”. The “infidels” back then were the Muslims, not the Christians as per the current ISIS terminology; but the congruency in the ideologies behind the definitions is clear.

Speaking of ISIS, when Zionism established the state of Israel, the Zionist aggression was (and continues to be) practised equally against both Arab Muslims and Christians. The anti-Zionist resistance was the Arab Resistance, and it was comprised of both Christians and Muslims. When Fateh was established, it was then meant to be an armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine. George Habash, the founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was a Christian.

Back then, the state of Israel was the ideological ISIS equivalent of the time, and the Palestinian resistance was a secular force trying to redeem freedom and secularism. In reality, the ISIS-like stance of Israel did not change at all.

To this effect, ISIS-minded Zionists regarded all Arabs as equally unequal to them, and when they were pillaging the Church of Nativity two decades ago, the West stood back and watched. The world seems to be totally at ease that the state of Israel continues to act as an ISIS; only of different denomination.

As Israel treated both Christian and Muslim Palestinians as second grade citizens, it was only natural for the anti-Israeli resistance to be nationally-based and driven. The slogan of those days was “Al-Quds lil Arab” ie Al-Quds belongs to Arabs. There was even a song with that title. The term Arabs meant back then referred to the inhabitants of the land; ie Muslims, Christians, as well as Jews who refute Zionism.

Suddenly, sometime in the 1980’s, a huge turn of events took place in Lebanon and Palestine almost at the same time.

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was soon followed by a resistance then named the “Lebanese Resistance”. Soon after Hezbollah rose to prominence the name changed to “Islamic Resistance”. In Palestine, Hamas rebunked the anti-Israeli resistance and turned into an Islamic resistance as well. All of a sudden, the struggle against Zionism changed course from a national secular Arab struggle into a religious one.

The biggest losers here are the Palestinian Christians as they are well and truly excluded by both Zionists and fundamentalist Muslims.

It is most ironic that Western Christian Zionists find it so easy to sympathize with Zionism, and at the same time manage to ignore the plight of Palestinian Christians. How ironic! The truth about Christian Zionists is that they are neither Christians nor Jews; they are Zionists, period.

When Islamists make claims of ownership of Palestine in general and of Al-Quds/Jerusalem to be specific, they would be using the same false argument of Zionists; only from their own equally unfounded perspective. Two wrongs do not make it right.

Fair and open-minded Palestinians, especially non-fundamentalist Muslims, need to realise that they have to make loud and clear statements to their policy makers that they refuse fanaticism and bigotry irrespective who the culprit is.

If we refute the ISIS mind, we must refute it in all of its forms, denominations and agendas. Justice cannot be selective any more than one wrong can be undone by another wrong.

Palestine is not for Muslims, nor is it for Jews or Christians; not exclusively. It is for all of them combined, but again not exclusively. Palestine is for its people, and they don’t have to belong to any of the Abrahamic religions. That land is for its people without any favouritism and exclusion. And, if any hard-line, orthodox, fanatic, violent, militant Zionist settlers don’t accept this, justice stipulates it is they who should be made to leave.

So back to President Putin and his hush-hush peace plan. Adversity often brings opportunities, and Putin is quite aware of the historical and geopolitical significance of the present moment.

Russia will most probably be trying to broker a two-state solution that is acceptable by all parties concerned. Realistically however, there is no lasting resolution that can be based on anything other than a one-state resolution in which all citizens have equal rights; just like any other self-respecting nation state. Any resolution short of this outcome is tantamount to endorsing an apartheid-type system.

This brings us back to the give-and-take concept for conflict resolution. Normally, in a negotiation situation, giving is seen to be for losers and taking is for winners, but reality can dictate pragmatic changes in direction; and it has, at least on the Palestinian side.

From the early days during which Palestinians expressed anger and frustration saying they wanted to push back Jewish migrants into the sea and restore the homeland from “water to water” (ie from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River), the Palestinian leadership had to learn from the humiliation of many defeats, numerous let downs from Arab states, the UN and the whole world, to accept to settle for the West Bank and Gaza in lieu of putting an end to armed resistance and acknowledging the state of Israel.

This Palestinian “acceptance” did not come easy and was not endorsed by all Palestinians, but when the PLO went to Oslo with this objective in mind with the expectation of a reciprocal “acceptance” from Israel, the final outcome was more than disappointing.

Israel reached its military height specifically on the 9th of June 1967; the day when Egyptian President Nasser made his resignation speech. At that point in time, Arabs were at their nadir, and with the most humiliating defeat they have endured in history, all they felt they could seek was a withdrawal of Israel to the pre-1967 war borders.

Slowly and gradually, Arabs had to go through the phase of denial of defeat that they were not prepared to accept.

They first demanded the UN for a resolution and managed to gain support for UNSC Resolution 224 which called for the unconditional Israeli withdrawal of Israel from the “occupied territory”. In this, Arab states accepted that the new definition of “occupied territory” meant what Israel managed to occupy during the Six-Day-War of 1967. This was a huge shift, because the original Arab definition of “occupied territory” meant all of Israel. But the Arab forced resignation to the status quo was not enough to persuade Israel into negotiating a land-for-peace deal. Israel was not prepared to give in order to take (peace).

The October 1973 War, aka Yom Kippur War, was a turning point in history. Even though the military gains of Egypt and Syria were not huge, they were big enough to change the course of events; at least psychologically. However, when Egyptian President Sadat signed a unilateral peace agreement with Israel, the Arab World fell into disarray.

In simple and short terms, Arab expectations were dwindling while the Israeli ones were escalating; despite the rise of the new form of anti-Israeli resistance spearheaded by Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Palestine’s Hamas.

In simple and short terms again, though Israel’s refusal to relent has resulted in creating an Arab camp that is prepared to accept its agenda, it also created another camp that has vowed to fiercely resist any settlement that does not provide justice to the Palestinian people, and this latter group has become battle-hardened and prepared to fight and inflict serious damage to Israel’s might.

The most prominent player here is the Hezbollah military factor that rained rockets on Israel during the July 2006 war, even hitting a frigate, and sees itself more capable in any future escalation. Hezbollah is deeply embedded in the Lebanese society and cannot be uprooted. It sees time to be on its side and it is moving from strength to strength.

The axis-of-resistance is living in the euphoria of the outcome of the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the many setbacks of Israel in Gaza and the victory of Syria against all odds.

The resistance side is waiting and poised for further confrontations. Hezbollah therefore will not easily accept any resolution that does not provide it with some real and tangible victory.

Meanwhile, Israel is tooth and nail still hanging on to the euphoria of the outcome of the 1967 Six-Day War. The Israeli side is not yet prepared to accept that time is not on its side. In a nutshell, Israel is not yet prepared to give so it can take (peace).

This will be Russia’s main obstacle in bringing all parties to negotiations on pragmatic grounds. Short of being able to convince Israel to give, Russia may find that the only way for this paradigm shift to happen in the Israeli psyche is through war; and in this case by a resounding Israeli defeat. This is perhaps why Russia is bolstering Syrian defences and specifically air defences. After all, if Israel loses its superiority in the air, and if its ground defences are unable to stop Hezbollah’s rockets, or at least some of them, then the new balance of power will no longer be on Israel’s side.

Now, will Netanyahu’s government, or any other future Israeli government for that matter, be prepared to take the risk of a new military confrontation with the prior knowledge that it has lost its upper hand in the fight? Will Israel accept to sacrifice its citizens in the hope that a new battle will restore its military superiority against all odds? To ask the question in a different way, what punishment does Israel need in order to be brought down to the negotiating table, the agenda of which is to find a way to establish a two-state solution let alone a one-state solution? But once again, Israel is not yet ready to give and take. It won’t return the Golan for any political gain, and it won’t even agree to lift the siege on Gaza.

At this stage, the best outcome to expect from Russian-mediated peace talks, with or without a war, if one is reached at all, is perhaps a two-state solution. This will be a huge step in the right direction, but in reality, such a resolution is nothing more than a disengagement. That said, Sharon’s wall has made it virtually impossible to draw practical border lines for a viable Palestinian state to exist, and thus created a nightmare for any future serious two-state-based peace talks. Whilst walls can be reconfigured, or even better torn down, in the long run, an apartheid two-state solution will always be morally wrong, and at best, should be regarded as an interim step towards establishing one state that ensures equal rights to all of its citizens.

 

Saturday, December 15, 2018

Why Iran Controlled Strait of Hormuz Remains US's Weak Spot. Interview with Ghassan Kadi. 14 December 2018


Analyst on Why Iran-Controlled Strait of Hormuz Remains US's Weak Spot

In this Tuesday, April 7, 2015, file photo released by the semi-official Fars News Agency, Iranian warship Alborz, foreground, prepares before leaving Iran's waters, at the Strait of Hormuz - Sputnik International
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Hassan Rouhani's threat to close the Strait of Hormuz was meant to show defiance and counter-intimidation against Washington's sabre-rattling, Ghassan Kadi, a political analyst told Sputnik, emphasising Iran's unique geographical position that allows it to maintain control over the Persian Gulf.

"Before Khomeini's Islamic Revolution [of 1979], the Shah of Iran was known as 'the policeman of the Gulf', i.e. America's policeman, and having him on its side, the US did not 'need' a huge military presence there", Ghassan Kadi, a political analyst of Syrian origin, told Sputnik, commenting on the mounting tensions between Washington and Tehran in the Persian Gulf.

Although the US had long called the shots in the region the Islamic Revolution tremendously affected the balance of force, according to the analyst.

"This changed dramatically after the fall of the shah", he continued. "And even though the formerly deactivated American Fifth Fleet was not reactivated till 1995, the American naval presence returned with force to the region. And when Iran Air Flight 655 was downed on 3 July 1988, it was shot down by American Navy vessels operating in the Gulf".

F-18 jet fighter takes off on the USS John C. Stennis, aircraft carrier in the South China Sea on Friday, April 15, 2016. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter visited the aircraft carrier during a trip to the region - Sputnik International
US to Resort to Use of Force if Iran Blocks Strait of Hormuz – Ex-CIA Officer
The Airbus A300 that flew from Tehran to Dubai, through Bandar Abbas, was shot down by an SM-2MR surface-to-air missile fired from the USS Vincennes, a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser.

The last essential US naval build-up in the region preceded Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, Kadi recalled.

Commenting on the latest deployment of a carrier strike group led by USS John C. Stennis in the Persian Gulf, he opined that "the arrival of a super carrier, or two, does not constitute a significant change to the status quo, and can only be seen as an action that seeks to intimidate the Iranians, no more".

The group arrived in the region on 8 December and took part in the joint naval exercises with the Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) on 12 December in the Arabian Sea. According to The Wall Street Journal, the dispatch of the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was aimed at intimidating Tehran.

Iranian Navy boats take part in maneuvers during the Velayat-90 navy exercises in the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran (File) - Sputnik International
Iranian Navy boats take part in maneuvers during the "Velayat-90" navy exercises in the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran (File)

Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: A Last Resort for Iran

Iran's strategic location allows it to maintain control over the Persian Gulf and particularly over the Strait of Hormuz. Thus it is hardly surprising that Tehran uses it as a bargaining chip amid the escalation of tensions between the US and Iran, prompted by the Trump administration's sanctions spree against the Islamic Republic.

Earlier Iranian President Hassan Rouhani signalled that Iran would block the Persian Gulf in case the US tried to prevent Iran from selling crude to its customers.

"A blockade of this nature, if it happens, will not only hurt America and its oil-exporting Arab allies and all nations that import oil from the Gulf, but it will also hurt Iran itself and its own customers; namely China, India, Japan, and South Korea", Kadi opined.

Iranian Navy boats take part in maneuvers during the Velayat-90 navy exercises in the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran (File) - Sputnik International
Iran Deploys Fleet to Gulf of Aden as Rouhani Threatens to Block Hormuz Strait
According to the analyst, "Iran will use this card as a last resort, and because Iran does not have super carriers to send into the Gulf of Mexico, threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz is also meant to be symbolic and to express defiance and counter-intimidation".

Kadi noted that Iranian lawmakers and military spokesmen keep reiterating that the Islamic Republic is quite capable to defending itself.

"Given the imbalance of power between Iran and America, it is highly unlikely that Iran will strike first. It would be foolhardy for Iran to deliberately opt to draw first blood", the analyst emphasised.

Trump's Waivers to Iran Customers are 'Laughable'

The latest batch of anti-Iranian sanctions imposed by Washington on November envisages disrupting Iran's oil trade. However, the US introduced waivers for eight countries — namely, China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Greece, Taiwan, and Turkey — to maintain the fragile balance on the crude market.

So, what will happen when the exemptions expire in six months?

"Let us ask a slightly different question here, will China succumb to America's demands in the South China Sea?" Kadi asked. "To say the US is granting China a temporary waiver to import Iranian oil is indeed laughable. I cannot see India succumbing either after the six-month waiver expires, it will be interesting though to see what Japan will do".

According to the analyst the escalation of tensions over Trump's oil sanctions against Iran is quite probable.

"Come May 2019, unless the impasse is somehow resolved, it may not just cause an escalation between America and Iran only, but also with China and possibly India; albeit unlikely a military one", he suggested.

Iran Missile Programme: Will EU Adopt US Narrative?

This photo released on Saturday, Nov. 9, 2013 by the Iranian Defense Ministry claims to show an air defense system with Sayyad-2 missiles prepared to be launched in an undisclosed location in Iran. - Sputnik International
US Sees Progress in Urging EU to Sanction Iran's Missile Program - State Dept
In the beginning of December, both Secretary of State Pompeo and German daily Die Welt raised the alarm over Tehran's missile programme with the media outlet claiming that Iran's rockets could reach Europe.

The analyst believes that the timing of this hysteria looks rather suspicious.

"Are Pompeo and Die Welt now admitting that Iran did not have missiles that could reach Europe back then, but they do now? Was the West giving inaccurate assessments back then or now or on both occasions?" he asked.

The political analyst wonders whether European MSM did "a study into the increase in the number of threats Iran is receiving".

"The real question about where will the EU stand vis-à-vis Iran is more about whether or not it will adopt the American narrative, rather than whether or not it genuinely believes that Iran poses a military threat", he concluded.

The views and opinions expressed by the contributors do not necessarily reflect those of Sputnik.